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1 Introduction
As the following quote by the European Central Bank’s chief economist shows, the in-
teraction of macroprudential and monetary policy is a highly relevant issue in central
banking:
“...a central bank may be prevented from tightening monetary conditions as would be oth-
erwise appropriate, if it fears that, by doing so, banks may suffer losses and see their
fragile health conditions undermined.”
Peter Praet, 11th March 2015, speech at the Conference ‘The ECB and Its Watchers XVI’.
The recent academic literature agrees with policy makers in recognizing that monetary
and macroprudential policies cannot be analyzed in isolation, and that an encompassing
framework is therefore needed.1 This paper analyzes, within a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) framework, how interest rate policies and bank capital requirements
interact and affect the business cycle. It proposes a model that combines New Keynesian
price setting frictions with financial market imperfections.
Credit demand and financial intermediation are modelled as follows. Similarly to
Bernanke et al. (1999), henceforth BGG, entrepreneurs have insufficient net worth to
buy capital and therefore borrow from banks. Entrepreneurs are subject to idiosyncratic
default risk, which gives rise to a costly state verification problem. When an entrepreneur
declares default, banks incur monitoring costs in order to observe the entrepreneur’s
realized return on capital. As in Zhang (2009), Benes and Kumhof (2015) and Clerc et
al. (2015), we depart from BGG by stipulating a default threshold that is contingent on
the aggregate return to capital. In BGG, debt contracts do not have this contingency,
such that the entrepreneur’s net worth varies together with aggregate risk. Since the
financial intermediary is then perfectly insulated from such risk, its balance sheet plays
no role. Here, in contrast, banks suffer balance sheet losses if entrepreneurial defaults are
higher than expected.
Banks have limited liability. When a bank fails, it is monitored by a bank resolution
authority, an action which destroys part of the bank’s remaining assets. Bank defaults
do not, however, affect the return on deposits. Full deposit insurance - financed through
lump sum taxes on households - removes any incentive for depositors to monitor the
banks’ activities and thus the deposit rate is equal to the policy rate. At the same time,
bank equity is limited to the accumulated wealth of bankers, who are the only agents
allowed to invest in banking. This results in a high equity return per unit invested. As a
consequence of expensive equity and cheap deposit funding, banks have an incentive to
maximize leverage. Due to limited liability, banks do not internalize the cost of increased
1See Leeper and Nason (2014), Smets, (2014), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016).
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banking sector fragility. The role of macroprudential policy, then, is to put a cap on bank
leverage so as to limit the amount of resources lost due to bank failures.
What do our macroeconomic policies look like? On the one hand, a consensus frame-
work for monetary policy has emerged in the form of interest rate feedback rules, as
proposed by Taylor (1993). We restrict attention to conventional monetary policy that
sets interest rates, and abstract from unconventional measures. As explained below, we
take into account the zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates.
Macroprudential policy, on the other hand, is modelled in different ways, depending
on the type of borrower, the financial contract and the policy instrument in question.
Our focus is on corporate borrowing from the financial sector. From a quantitative point
of view, nonfinancial corporate debt is more important than household debt. Figure 1
shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio of non-financial business amounted to 110% in 2000
and increased to almost 140% in 2017. The debt-to-GDP ratio of households, instead,
shows an increasing trend up to 2008, when it reached a record high of 99%, and then
started to decline gradually to the value of 80%.2
[ insert Figure 1 here ]
The long-run policy instrument in our model is a minimum bank capital-to-asset
ratio, which forces banks to fund part of their assets using relatively more expensive
equity capital. This is combined with a cyclical instrument that is meant to dampen the
financial cycle. The cyclical macroprudential instrument can take one of two forms. We
model it either as a countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) to capture Basel III regulation,
or as a “leaning against the wind” (LATW) policy, whereby the interest rate responds to
lending with a positive coefficient, a practice followed e.g. by the Swedish central bank.
Monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), which forces the
central bank to be too tight in a downturn due to the fact that interest rates cannot
turn negative. Within our modelling framework, we discuss the effects of the ZLB and
macroprudential policy on the transmission mechanism of the model by looking at impulse
responses to technology shocks and to bank and firm risk shocks.
Our determinacy analysis reveals that the coefficient on lending in the macropruden-
tial rule, i.e. the CCB coefficient, must be above a certain threshold in order for the
Taylor Principle to be satisfied. The LATW policy always requires a passive monetary
policy for a unique equilibrium.
Under a countercyclical macroprudential policy (“CCB policy”), the ZLB has severe
consequences on output when the economy is hit by an adverse firm risk shock. Thus, in
2Similarly, Euro Area data (ECB, 2012) show that the debt-to-GDP ratio of non-financial corpora-
tions is quantitatively more relevant than debt-to-GDP ratio of households. The former amounted to
60% in 2000 and increased up to almost 80% in 2011, while the debt-to-GDP ratio of households was
almost 50% in 2000 and 65% in 2011.
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the presence of firm risk shocks, the ZLB acts as an important constraint on monetary
policy and it is all the more important for macroprudential policy to be active. In the
case of the other two types of shocks, inflation and output move in opposite directions
and hence the ZLB-constraint is less consequential. The stronger the response of the
CCB policy, the lower the firm default rate and the milder the output contraction. The
ZLB has virtually no effect on real variables in response to a firm risk shock under a
LATW policy which requires an accommodative monetary policy. A contractionary bank
risk shock, instead, acts as a supply disturbance due to the reduced capacity of bankers
to provide loans, leading to a fall in output and a rise in inflation. Similarly to the firm
risk shock, a more aggressive CCB policy makes the simulated recession less severe by
reducing the bank default rate.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 presents
the determinacy analysis. Section 4 investigates the dynamic properties of the model.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We now sketch the model, which features a costly state verification problem both for
entrepreneurs and for banks. Banks monitor failed entrepreneurs and a bank resolu-
tion authority monitors failed banks. Given the non-state-contingent nature of the loan
contract, entrepreneurial defaults affect bank balance sheets. We first discuss the non-
financial sector; second, we explain the workings of the financial sector. Third, we present
the monetary and macroprudential policy rules. Finally, the rest of the model contains
the household sector, goods production and market clearing.
2.1 Non-Financial Sector
This section discusses in detail the loan contract between entrepreneurs and banks.
Townsend (1979) analyzes a costly state verification problem where the entrepreneur’s
return cannot be observed by the lender without incurring a monitoring cost. He shows
that the optimal contract in the presence of idiosyncratic risk is a standard debt contract
in which the repayment does not depend on the entrepreneur’s project outcome. This
argument is used in the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999), where the debt contract between the borrower and the lender specifies a fixed
repayment rate. In the case of default, the lender engages in costly monitoring and seizes
the entrepreneur’s remaining capital.
As in Bernanke et al. (1999), the risk to the entrepreneur has an aggregate as well
as an idiosyncratic component. The latter depends on the aggregate return to capital,
which is observable. Carlstrom, Fuerst, Ortiz and Paustian (2014) ask “why should the
4
loan contract call for costly monitoring when the event that leads to a poor return is
observable by all parties?”. Indeed, Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2016) show that
the privately optimal contract includes indexation to the aggregate return to capital,
which they call Rk-indexation. They argue that this type of contract comes close to
financial contracts observed in practice. Furthermore, Carlstrom et al. (2014) estimate a
high degree of indexation in a medium-scale business cycle model. Consistent with these
findings, we stipulate a financial contract whereby the entrepreneur’s default threshold
depends on the aggregate return to capital.
Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs indicated by the superscript ‘E’.3 They
combine net worth and bank loans to purchase capital from the capital production sector
and rent it to intermediate goods producers. Entrepreneurs face a probability 1 − χE
of surviving to the next period. Let WEt be entrepreneurial wealth accumulated from
operating firms. Entrepreneurs have zero labor income. Aggregate entrepreneurial net
worth nEt+1 is the wealth held by entrepreneurs at t who are still in business in t+ 1,
nEt+1 =
(
1− χE)WEt+1. (1)
Entrepreneurs who die consume their residual wealth, i.e. cEt+1 = χEWEt+1. Aggregate
entrepreneurial wealth in period t+ 1, measured in terms of final consumption goods, is
given by the value of their capital stock bought in the previous period, qtKt, multiplied by
the ex-post nominal return on capital REt+1, multiplied by the fraction of returns which are
left to the entrepreneur 1−ΓEt+1, discounted by the gross rate of inflation, Πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt,
that is,
WEt+1 =
(
1− ΓEt+1
) REt+1qtKt
Πt+1
. (2)
The discussion of the contracting problem between entrepreneurs and banks below con-
tains a derivation of ΓEt+1.
The entrepreneur purchases capital Kt at the real price qt per unit. The amount qtKt
spent on capital goods exceeds her net worth nEt . She borrows the remainder,
bt = qtKt − nEt , (3)
from the full range of banks, which in turn obtain funds from depositors and equity holders
(’bankers’). Capital is chosen at t and used for production at t + 1. It has an ex-post
gross return ωEt+1REt+1, where REt+1 is the aggregate return on capital (as stated above)
and ωEt+1 is an idiosyncratic disturbance. The idiosyncratic productivity disturbance is iid
3In the model appendix, we use the index j ∈ (0, 1) to refer to an individual entrepreneur. For
notational convenience, we drop the index here.
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log-normally distributed with mean E{ωEt+1} = 1 and a time-varying standard deviation
σEt = σ
EςEt , where ςEt is a firm risk shock. The probability of default for an individual
entrepreneur is given by the respective cumulative distribution function evaluated at the
threshold ωEt+1, to be specified below,
FEt+1 = F
E(ωEt+1) ≡
∫ ωEt+1
0
fE(ωEt+1)dω
E
t+1, (4)
where fE(·) is the respective probability density function.
The ex-post gross return to entrepreneurs, in terms of consumption, of holding a unit
of capital from t to t + 1 is given by the rental rate on capital, rKt+1, plus the capital
gain net of depreciation, (1− δ) qt+1, divided by the real price of capital, in period t. In
nominal terms, this is:
REt+1 =
rKt+1 + (1− δ) qt+1
qt
Πt+1. (5)
The financial contract, which we turn to next, determines how the project return is
divided between the entrepreneur and the bank.
Financial Contract
After the financial contract is signed, the entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic productivity shock
realizes. Those entrepreneurs whose productivity is below the threshold,
ωEt+1 =
Ztbt
REt+1qtKt
=
xEt
REt+1
, (6)
declare default. In (6), xEt ≡ Ztbt/(qtKt) is the entrepreneur’s loan-to-value ratio, the
contractual debt repayment divided by the value of capital purchased. Here, the cutoff
ωEt+1 is contingent on the realization of the aggregate state REt+1, such that aggregate
shocks produce fluctuations in firm default rates, which in turn impinge on bank balance
sheets.
The details of the financial contract are as follows. In the default case, the en-
trepreneur has to turn the whole return ωEt+1REt+1qtKt over to the bank. Of this, a fraction
µE is lost as a monitoring cost that the bank needs to incur to verify the entrepreneur’s
project return. In the non-default case, the bank receives only the contractual payment
ωEt+1R
E
t+1qtKt. The remainder, (ωEt+1 − ωEt+1)REt+1qtKt, goes to the residual claimant, the
entrepreneur. Consequently, if the entrepreneur does not default, the payment to the
bank is independent of the realization of the idiosyncratic shock but contingent on the
aggregate return REt+1.
Following the notation in BGG (1999), we define the share of the project return
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REt+1qtKt accruing to the bank, gross of monitoring costs, as
ΓEt+1 = Γ
E(ωEt+1) ≡
∫ ωEt+1
0
ωEt+1f(ω
E
t+1)dω
E
t+1 +
(
1− FEt+1
)
ωEt+1, (7)
such that remainder, 1 − ΓEt+1, represents the share of the return which is left for the
entrepreneur. The share of the project return subject to firm defaults is defined as
follows,
GEt+1 = G
E(ωEt+1) ≡
∫ ωEt+1
0
ωEt+1f
E(ωEt+1)dω
E
t+1. (8)
Being risk-neutral, the entrepreneur cares only about the expected return on his invest-
ment given by
Et
{[
1− ΓE
(
xEt
REt+1
)]
REt+1qtKt
}
, (9)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random variable REt+1.
The bank finances loans using equity nBt and deposits dt; its balance sheet is bt =
nBt + dt. Furthermore, it is subject to the following capital requirement,
nBt ≥ φtbt, (10)
which says that equity must be at least a fraction φt of bank assets.4 The bank’s ex-post
gross return on loans, in nominal terms, is given by
RFt+1 =
(
ΓEt+1 − µEGEt+1
) REt+1qtKt
bt
. (11)
In order for the bank to agree to the terms of the contract, the return which the bank
earns from lending to the entrepreneur must be equal to or greater than the return that
the bank would obtain from investing its equity in the interbank market,
Et
{(
1− ΓFt+1
) [
ΓE
(
xEt
REt+1
)
− µEGE
(
xEt
REt+1
)]
REt+1qtKt
}
≥ φtEt
{
RBt+1(qtKt − nEt )
}
, (12)
where RBt+1 is the ex-post gross nominal equity return and 1−ΓFt+1 is the share of the loan
return accruing to the banker after the bank has made interest payments to its depositors
(to be derived in Section 2.4 below).
The entrepreneur’s objective is to choose xEt and Kt+1 to maximize her expected
profit (9), subject to the bank’s participation constraint (12), which can be written as an
equality without loss of generality. The optimality conditions of the contracting problem
4Our required capital ratio is based on total assets given that in the model, we do not work with
different risk classes.
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are
Et{−ΓE′t+1 + ξt
(
1− ΓFt+1
) (
ΓE′t+1 − µEGE′t+1
)} = 0, (13)
Et{
(
1− ΓEt+1
)
REt+1 + ξt
[(
1− ΓFt+1
) (
ΓEt+1 − µEGEt+1
)
REt+1 − φtRBt+1
]} = 0, (14)
where ξt is the Lagrange multiplier on the bank participation constraint (12).
2.2 Financial Sector
The financial sector consists of a range of banks with idiosyncratic productivity. Banks
receive equity funding from bankers and deposit funding from households. Deposits are
fully insured; depositors therefore have no incentive to monitor a bank’s activities and
receive the risk-free return that coincides with the policy rate. Since bankers are the only
agents in the economy allowed to hold bank equity, the size of total equity funding is
restricted to the bankers’ accumulated wealth. This restriction keeps the equity return -
per unit of equity held - high. Bankers have limited liability and can walk away if a bank
defaults. As deposit funding is cheap and equity funding is expensive, banks therefore
have an incentive to maximize leverage and will hold only the minimum amount of capital
as required by the macroprudential authority. Those financial institutions that are unable
to pay depositors using their returns on corporate loans fail; they are monitored by a tax-
funded bank resolution authority.
Bankers
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), households have a unit mass and consist of two
types of people. A proportion F of household members are bankers and the remaining
1−F are workers. Similar to Merz (1995), where only a fraction of household members
are employed, consumption is nevertheless equalized across members through perfect
intra-household risk sharing. Every period, some individuals switch between the two
occupations. In particular, a person who is currently a banker has a constant probability
1−χB of remaining a banker in the next period, which is independent of the time already
spent in the banking sector.5 Every period (1 − χB)F bankers thus quit banking and
become workers. The same number of workers randomly become bankers, such that the
proportions of bankers and workers within the household remain fixed. Bankers who quit
transfer their wealth to their respective household. The household uses a fraction ι of
this transfer to provide its new bankers with startup funds, as is described below.
A banker’s only investment opportunity is to provide equity to banks. We suppose
that a banker holds a diversified portfolio of bank equity, by investing his net worth in
all banks. Let nBt denote the aggregate net worth of bankers. Bankers obtain an ex-post
5The average lifetime of a banker is thus 1/(1 − χB). Bankers have a finite horizon such that they
do not accumulate enough wealth to fund all investments without the need for external borrowing.
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aggregate nominal return of RBt+1 on their investment, which determines their wealth in
the next period,
WBt+1 =
RBt+1n
B
t
Πt+1
. (15)
The return on equity is the ratio of bank profits to banker net worth,
RBt+1 =
(1− ΓFt+1)RFt+1bt
nBt
, (16)
where the share of the bank’s return on loans accruing to the banker, 1−ΓFt+1, is derived
below. Combining (15) and (16), we can write banker wealth as WBt+1 = (1−ΓFt+1)R
F
t+1bt
Πt+1
.
Aggregate net worth of existing bankers is the wealth held by bankers at t who are
still around one period later, nBet+1 = (1 − χB)WBt+1. A banker who leaves the banking
business turns his residual equity over to the household. Newly entering bankers receive
‘‘startup’’ funds from their respective households, which are a fraction ι/χB of the value
of exiting bankers’ wealth, i.e. nBnt+1 = ιWBt+1. Therefore, aggregate banker net worth is
given by the sum of existing and new bankers’ net worth,
nBt+1 = (1− χB + ι)WBt+1, (17)
and bank profits retained by the households are ΞBt+1 = (1− ι/χB)χBWBt+1.
Banks
There is a range of banks indexed by i, each with idiosyncratic productivity ωFit+1. Since
all banks behave in the same way in equilibrium, we suppress the index i from here on.
Banks are subject to limited liability, the representative bank’s profit in period t + 1 is
therefore
ΞFt+1 = max
[
ωFt+1R
F
t+1bt −RDt+1dt, 0
]
, (18)
The bank fails if it has negative profits. Similar to the entrepreneurial sector, there exists
a threshold productivity level ωFt+1 below which a bank fails,
ωFt+1R
F
t+1bt = R
D
t+1dt. (19)
Using the definition of the bank productivity cutoff (19) to replace RDt+1dt, we can rewrite
bank profits (18) as ΞFt+1 = max
[
ωFt+1 − ωFt+1, 0
]
RFt+1bt. The random variable ωFt+1 is log-
normally distributed with mean E{ωFt+1} = 1 and a time-varying standard deviation
σFt = σ
F ςFt , where ςFt is a bank risk shock. In the following, we introduce notation that is
analogous to the entrepreneurial sector. Let F Ft denote the probability of bank default,
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such that
F Ft+1 = F
F (ωFt+1) ≡
∫ ωFt+1
0
f(ωFt+1)dω
F
t+1. (20)
The share of the return on loans subject to bank defaults is defined as
GFt+1 = G
F (ωFt+1) ≡
∫ ωFt+1
0
ωFt+1f(ω
F
t+1)dω
F
t+1, (21)
of which a fraction µF is lost when the bank resolution authority monitors a failed bank.
We derive the share of the bank’s loan return RFt+1bt accruing to the banker as
max
[
ωFt+1 − ωFt+1, 0
]
=
∫ ∞
ωFt+1
ωFt+1f(ω
F
t+1)dω
F
t+1 − ωFt+1
∫ ∞
ωFt+1
f(ωFt+1)dω
F
t+1 = 1− ΓFt+1,
where we have used the definition
ΓFt+1 = Γ
F (ωFt+1) ≡
∫ ωEt+1
0
ωFt+1f(ω
F
t+1)dω
F
t+1 +
(
1− F Ft
)
ωFt+1. (22)
With this simplified notation, we can write bank profits as ΞFt+1 = (1− ΓFt+1)RFt+1bt.
2.3 Monetary and Macroprudential Policies
We now specify two types of macroeconomic policies: monetary policy and macropruden-
tial policy. There are two dimensions in which these policies work: at the steady state
and out of steady state. At the steady state, the policy maker chooses a target value for
inflation, Π, and a bank capital ratio, φ. Out of steady state, inflation and the capital
requirement are set according to feedback rules. We consider a monetary policy rule by
which the central bank may adjust the policy rate in response to its own lag, inflation
and lending. The respective feedback coefficients are τR, τΠ and τb, such that:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)τR (Πt
Π
)τΠ (bt
b
)τb
. (23)
Thanks to full deposit insurance financed through lump-sum taxation, the policy rate
and the deposit rate are identical, Rt = RDt . Macroprudential policy is given by a rule
for the capital requirement,
φt
φ
=
(
bt
b
)ζb
. (24)
The objective of monetary policy is to stabilize inflation so as to minimize the price
adjustment costs that firms face. The objective of macroprudential policy is to stabilize
the bank default rate so as to minimize the bank resolution costs incurred by taxpayers
in the case of bank failures.
10
2.4 Rest of the Model
The remainder of the model is a standard New Keynesian setup. Households choose their
optimal consumption and labor supply within the period, and their optimal bank deposits
across periods. Within the production sector, we distinguish between final goods produc-
ers, intermediate goods producers, and capital goods producers. Final goods producers
are perfectly competitive. They create consumption bundles by combining intermediate
goods using a constant-elasticity-of-substitution technology and sell them to the house-
hold sector and to capital producers. Intermediate goods producers use capital and labor
to produce, with a Cobb-Douglas technology, the goods used as inputs by the final goods
producers. They set prices subject to quadratic adjustment costs, which introduces a
New Keynesian Phillips curve in our model. Finally, capital goods producers buy the
final good and convert it to capital, which they sell to the entrepreneurs.
Households
Households are infinitely lived and have expected lifetime utility,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln ct − ϕ l
1+η
t
1 + η
)
, (25)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, ct is consumption, lt is labor supply,
ϕ is the relative weight on labor disutility and η ≥ 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity of
labor supply. The household chooses paths for ct, lt and bank deposits dt to maximize
(25) subject to a sequence of budget constraints,
ct + dt + tt ≤ wtlt + R
D
t dt−1
Πt
+ ΞKt + Ξ
B
t + Ξ
P
t , (26)
where tt are lump sum taxes (in terms of the final consumption good), wt is the real
wage, RDt is the gross interest rate on deposits paid in period t, ΞKt and ΞPt are capi-
tal goods producers’ and intermediate goods producers’ profits, respectively, which are
redistributed to households in a lump sum fashion. Finally, ΞBt are profits of exiting
bankers, less the startup funding granted to new bankers. The household’s first order
optimality conditions can be simplified to a labor supply equation, wt = ϕlηt /Λt, and
a consumption Euler equation, 1 = Et
{
βt,t+1R
D
t+1/Πt+1
}
, where βt,t+s = βsΛt+sΛt is the
household’s stochastic discount factor between t and t + s and the Lagrange multiplier
on the budget constraint (26), Λt = 1/ct, captures the shadow value of household wealth
in real terms.
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Final Goods Producers
A final goods firm bundles the differentiated industry goods Yit, with i ∈ (0, 1), taking as
given their price Pit, and sells the output Yt at the competitive price Pt. The optimization
problem of the final goods firm is to choose the amount of inputs Yit that maximizes profits
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
YitPitdi, subject to the production function Yt = (
∫ 1
0
Y
ε−1
ε
it di)
ε
ε−1 , where ε > 1
is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The resulting demand for
intermediate good i is Y dit = (Pit/Pt)−ε Yt. The price of final output, which we interpret
as the price index, is given by Pt = (
∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di)
1
1−ε . In a symmetric equilibrium, the price
of a variety and the price index coincide, Pt = Pit.
Intermediate Goods Producers
Firms use capital and labor to produce intermediate goods according to a Cobb-Douglas
production function. The assumption of constant returns to scale allows us to write
the production function as an aggregate relationship. Each individual firm produces
a differentiated good using Yit = AtKαit−1l1−αit , where α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share
in production, At is aggregate technology, Kit−1 is capital and lit is labor. Intermediate
goods firms choose factor inputs to maximize per-period profits given by PitYit
Pt
−rKt Kit−1−
wtlit, where the real rental rate on capital rKt and the real wage wt are taken as given,
subject to the technological constraint and the demand constraint. The resulting demands
for capital and labor are wtlit = (1 − α)sitYit and rKt Kit−1 = αsitYit, respectively, where
the Lagrange multiplier on the demand constraint, sit, represents real marginal costs. By
combining the two factor demands, we obtain an expression showing that real marginal
costs are symmetric across producers,
st =
w1−αt (r
K
t )
α
αα(1− α)1−α
1
At
. (27)
Firm i sets an optimal path for its product price Pit to maximize the present discounted
value of future profits, subject to the demand constraint and to price adjustment costs,
Et
∞∑
s=0
βt,t+s
Pit+sY dit+s
Pt+s
− κp
2
(
Pit+s
Π
λp
t+s−1Pit+s−1
− 1
)2
Yit+s + st+s
(
Yit+s − Y dit+s
) . (28)
Price adjustment costs are given by the second term in square brackets in (28); they
depend on firm revenues and on last period’s aggregate inflation rate. The parameter
κp > 0 scales the price adjustment costs and 0 ≤ λp ≤ 1 captures indexation to past
inflation Πt−1. Under symmetry, all firms produce the same amount of output, and the
firm’s price Pit equals the aggregate price level Pt, such that the price setting condition
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is
κp
Πt
Π
λp
t−1
(
Πt
Π
λp
t−1
− 1
)
= εst − (ε− 1) + κpEt
{
βt,t+1
Πt+1
Π
λp
t
(
Πt+1
Π
λp
t
− 1
)
Yt+1
Yt
}
. (29)
In (29), perfectly flexible prices are given by κp → 0. If λp = 0, there is no indexation
to past inflation and we obtain a purely forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve.
Under symmetry across intermediate goods producers, profits (in real terms) are thus
ΞPt = Yt − rKt Kt−1 − wtlt − κp2 (ΠtΠ
−λp
t−1 − 1)2Yt.
Capital Goods Production
The representative capital-producing firm chooses a path for investment It to maximize
profits given by Et
∑∞
s=0 βt,t+s [qt+s∆xt+s − It+s]. Net capital accumulation is defined as:
∆xt = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 =
[
1− κI
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
It, (30)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital depreciation rate and the term κI
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
captures
investment adjustment costs as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). The opti-
mality condition for investment is given by:
1 = qt
[
1− κI
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− κI
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
]
+Et
{
qt+1βt,t+1κI
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2}
. (31)
Capital producers’ profits, in real terms, are ΞKt = qt [Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1]− It.
Market Clearing
Consumption goods produced must equal goods demanded by households and entrepreneurs,
goods used for investment, resources lost when adjusting prices, and resources lost in the
recovery of funds associated with entrepreneur and bank defaults,
Yt = ct + c
E
t + It +
κp
2
(
Πt
Π
λp
t−1
− 1
)2
Yt + µ
FGFt
RFt bt−1
Πt
+ µEGEt
REt qt−1Kt−1
Πt
. (32)
Firms’ labor demand must equal labor supply, (1− α)st Ytlt =
ϕtl
η
t
Λt
.
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Aggregate Uncertainty
The logarithm of technology follows a stationary AR(1) process,
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + εAt , (33)
where ρA ∈ (0, 1) and εAt is an iid shock with mean zero and standard deviation σA.
As noted above, the random variables ωEt+1 and ωFt+1 have log-normal distributions with
mean one and a standard deviation σEt = σEςEt , which introduces time variability of firm
and bank risk via the autoregressive processes,
ln ςEt = ρE ln ς
E
t−1 + ε
E
t , (34)
ln ςFt = ρF ln ς
F
t−1 + ε
F
t , (35)
with ρE ∈ (0, 1) and ρF ∈ (0, 1). Let the parameters σEς and σFς denote the standard
deviations of the iid normal shocks εEt and εFt , respectively.
Equilibrium
The model is closed with a monetary policy rule that governs the policy rate Rt and a
macroprudential rule that governs the capital ratio, φt. We are now ready to provide a
formal definition of equilibrium in our economy.
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium is a set of allocations {lt, Kt, It, ct, Yt, nEt , bt, nBt , dt,
xEt }∞t=0, prices {wt, rKt , qt, Πt, st}∞t=0 and rates of return {RFt , REt , RBt }∞t=0 for which, given
the monetary and macroprudential policies {Rt, φt}∞t=0 and shocks to technology, firm and
bank risk {At, ςEt , ςFt }∞t=0 entrepreneurs maximize the expected return on their investment,
firms and banks maximize profits, households maximize utility and all markets clear.
2.5 Calibration and Steady State
To derive the deterministic steady state, we solve numerically for the entrepreneur and
bank productivity cutoffs, ωE and ωF , the proportion of the project return lost in mon-
itoring, µE, the entrepreneur exit rate χE, the standard deviations of the idiosyncratic
shock hitting firms and banks, σE and σF , and the bank failure rate F F . Given initial
values for those steady state parameters, we can solve for the remaining steady state
variables recursively as shown in Table 1.
[ insert Table 1 here ]
In the model, a time period is interpreted as one quarter. We normalize technology
and risk shocks in steady state by setting A = ςE = ςF = 1. We also normalize labor,
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l = 1, and set the weight on labor disutility, ϕ, equal to 0.7624 to meet this target. The
calibration of our model parameters is summarized in Table 2.
[ insert Table 2 here ]
We set Π = 1.005 to yield an annualized inflation rate of 2 percent as observed in US
data over the period 1984-2016. The subjective discount factor β is set to 0.99, implying
a quarterly risk-free (gross) nominal interest rate of R = 1.005
0.99
. The inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is set to η = 1, as in Christiano et al. (2014). This value lies
in between the micro estimates of the Frisch elasticity, which are typically below 1, and
the calibrated values used in macro studies, which tend to be above 1. As is standard
in the literature (see Bernanke et al., 1999, and Carlstrom et al., 2016, among many
others), the capital share in production is set to α = 0.35, while the depreciation rate
is δ = 0.025, such that 10% of the capital stock has to be replaced each year. The
substitution elasticity between goods varieties is ε = 6, implying a gross steady state
markup of ε
ε−1 = 1.2 (Christensen and Dib, 2008). The Rotemberg price adjustment cost
parameter is κp = 30, which corresponds to a price duration of around 3 quarters in the
Calvo model of staggered price adjustment; that value is in line with the duration implied
by the posterior estimate of the Calvo parameter in Smets and Wouters (2007).6 The
investment adjustment cost parameter is set to κI = 2.43, the estimate of Carlstrom et
al. (2014) for the indexation-to-Rk model. The financial parameters and interest rates
are displayed in Table 3.
[ insert Table 3 here ]
We first discuss the financial parameters, before turning to the ranking of the various
interest rates and spreads in steady state. Following BGG (1999), we target (i) a ratio
of capital to net worth, ϱ ≡ qK
nE
, of 2, (ii) a spread between the return on capital and the
deposit rate, υE ≡ RE
RD
, of 200 basis points per year, and (iii) a quarterly entrepreneur
default rate of FE = 0.0075, which corresponds to an annual default rate of 3%. As far
as the banking sector is concerned, we set the following two targets: (i) a steady state
capital requirement for banks, i.e. the ratio of equity to loans, of 8%, that is φ = 0.08
as recommended by the Basel Accords, and (ii) an equity return premium, υB ≡ RB
RD
, of
600 basis points per annum in line with empirical evidence.7 Bank monitoring costs are
calibrated to µF = 0.3 as in Clerc et al. (2015).8 Laeven and Valencia (2010) report a
median fraction of bank assets lost due to bank failures - in the US between 1986 and
6For the algebraic relationship between the Rotemberg and the Calvo parameter see Cantore et al.
(2014).
7The series of the spread is computed as the difference between the return on average equity for all
U.S. banks and the 10-Year treasury constant maturity rate in the period 1984Q1-2016Q3.
8Differently from the monitoring cost related to the entrepreneurial sector, bank monitoring costs
µFdo not affect the computation of the steady state financial variables (see equations (32)-(33) in Table
1). They only appear in the aggregate resource constraint.
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2008 - of around 20%. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), the proportional transfer to the
entering bankers is set to ι = 0.002.
In the following, we report the implied financial parameters and provide an interpre-
tation for our results. In the corporate sector, we obtain a productivity cutoff of roughly
one half, ωE = 0.499, a monitoring cost equal to µE = 10%, a standard deviation of the
idiosyncratic shock to the project return of σE = 0.271, and an entrepreneur exit rate of
χE = 0.018. In the banking sector, we find a productivity cutoff of ωF = 0.92, a standard
deviation of the bank risk shock equal to σF = 0.029, a bank failure rate of 0.9% per
annum. The banker exit rate is found to be χB = 0.022.
In our model, bank resolution costs are substantially higher than firm monitoring
costs (µF > µE). This may reflect the greater opaqueness of bank balance sheets, which
makes monitoring more difficult (Morgan, 2002). Moreover, the role of banks in financial
intermediation suggests that the costs and externalities associated with bank failures are
particularly high. E.g. Kupiec and Ramirez (2013) find that bank failures cause non-
bank commercial failures and have long-lasting negative effects on economic growth. Our
implied banker turnover rate χB is in the ballpark of the numbers found in the literature,
e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Angeloni and Faia (2013) impose a value of 0.028
and 0.03, respectively. On the one hand, our probability of bank default F F lies below
the value reported in De Walque et al. (2010) using the Z-score method to compute the
probability that banks’ own funds are not sufficient to absorb losses, which yields 0.4%
p.a., and the ratio of bank failures to the number of commercial banks, which is 0.9%
p.a. for the period 1984-2015 according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.9
On the other hand, if we count bank closings rather than failures, we find a rate of 2.7%
p.a. in US data.10 Our value therefore lies within this range of estimates.
The risk-free rate corresponds to the deposit rate RD and to the policy rate R in
steady state. The realized return on bank loans is RF . This return contains a discount
which is related to the monitoring cost that the bank must incur when an entrepreneur
declares default. The next higher rate of return is the return on capital, RE. The return
on capital is higher than the realized loan return RF , because it needs to compensate
the entrepreneur for running the risk of default while it is not reduced by the monitoring
cost. Finally, the return on equity earned by bankers RB exceeds the realized loan return,
because it contains a compensation to bankers (or equity holders) for the risk of bank
default. In addition, the loan return is a decreasing function of the capital requirement
φ; the higher is the capital requirement, the more equity banks will hold, and hence the
lower is the implied return on equity, RB.
9The annual number of banks and bank failures in the US, starting in 1936, can be downloaded from
www.fdic.gov.
10Bank closings are downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Business Dynamics database,
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?db. The industry considered is ‘Credit intermediation and related ac-
tivities’.
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We assume autoregressive processes for the (log) technology shock, lnAt, the (log)
firm risk shock, ln ςEt , and the (log) bank risk shock, ln ςFt . Similarly to Benes and Kumhof
(2015) and Batini et al. (2016), we set the standard deviations and the persistence of
the shock processes via moment-matching of the empirical standard deviations and the
persistences of real output, real lending and equity in the financial business in the United
States.11 In particular, we construct a quadratic loss function∑6j=1(xmj −xdj )2, where xmj
is the j-th moment in the model and xmj is its analogue in the data, and we numerically
search for those parameters that minimize the loss function. This procedure leads to
estimates of persistent TFP and bank risk shocks, with ρA = 0.9594 and ρF = 0.9798,
while the firm risk shock is somewhat less persistent, with ρE = 0.7810. The standard
deviations are small and equal to σA = 0.001, σEς = 0.001, and σFς = 0.0001, respectively.
3 Determinacy Analysis
Our interest lies in the interdependence of monetary and macroprudential policies. We
consider two setups.
First, we stipulate an interest rate rule for monetary policy with τb = 0 and we allow
for macroprudential policy to set a bank capital requirement in response to changes in
borrowing, such that ζb > 0. The macroprudential rule captures the Basel III policy rec-
ommendation of a countercyclical capital buffer (‘CCB’) prescribing a rise in the capital
requirement in response to a rise in the credit-to-GDP gap above a certain threshold, see
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010a, 2010b).12
Second, we keep the bank capital ratio constant at φ and allow for the policy interest
rate to respond to borrowing, such that τb > 0 and ζb = 0. The latter setup is a ‘leaning
against the wind’ (LATW) policy and it is inspired both by policy debates and by actual
policy actions. E.g. starting in 2010, the Swedish central bank raised interest rates with
the explicit aim of responding to household indebtedness, see Svensson (2014).13
We begin by analyzing the equilibrium properties of the benchmark model, given a
plausible range of policy coefficients for τΠ and ζb in the CCB setup and for τΠ and τb in the
LATW setup. More precisely, we show the combination of non-negative policy coefficients
that give rise to a unique stable equilibrium, explosive dynamics, and multiple equilibria.
The corresponding areas in the graphs below are labelled ‘determinate’, ‘explosive’ and
‘multiple’, respectively.
[ insert Figure 2 here ]
11Data are taken from the Alfred database of the St. Louis Fed and the Flow of Funds for the period
1952Q1-2016Q1. The time series are detrended using the HP filter.
12Tente et al. (2015, p.14) discuss how the CCB rate is computed for Germany.
13DSGE models featuring financial frictions often incorporate “macroprudential” rules which allow
stabilization of the financial variables (e.g. Benes and Kumhof, 2015; Clerc et al., 2015).
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Figure 2 shows the determinacy regions for the model with a countercyclical capital buffer.
As is discussed in detail in Lewis and Roth (2017), the result resembles the one in Leeper
(1991) regarding the determinacy properties in a model with monetary and fiscal policy
interactions. The positive orthant in (ζb, τΠ)-space is neatly divided into four regions, with
the dark shaded areas at the top right and the bottom left showing policy coefficients
that give rise to a unique stable equilibrium. In the absence of a countercyclical capital
buffer, ζb = 0, we see that the Taylor Principle is violated. In effect, there is a threshold
value for the CCB coefficient ζ¯b above which the Taylor Principle holds. For lower values
of ζb, macroprudential policy does not stabilize lending, a situation we may call ‘financial
dominance’, which forces monetary policy to violate the Taylor Principle and allow for
inflation to rise. If it instead adheres to the Taylor Principle (upper left region in Figure
2), the model features explosive equilibrium dynamics characterized by Fisherian debt-
disinflation effects. For high values of ζb and a low responsiveness to inflation in the
interest rate rule (the bottom right region in Figure 2), multiple equilibria exist. This
suggests that the central bank can only be hawkish - and set an inflation coefficient above
unity - if macroprudential policy is sufficiently responsive to increases in lending above
steady state.
[ insert Figure 3 here ]
Figure 3 illustrates the determinacy properties in the model with LATW. We obtain two
regions. Irrespective of the ‘leaning-against-the-wind’ policy coefficient τb, the Taylor
Principle is violated and we need an inflation coefficient below 1 for determinacy. Stronger
responses to inflation result in explosive dynamics. The higher the LATW coefficient τb,
the lower is the threshold level τpi below which the model has a determinate solution.
4 A Dynamic Analysis of the Monetary and Macro-
prudential Policy
This section analyzes the interdependence of monetary and macroprudential policy via
impulse response function analysis. In particular, it discusses the effects of monetary
and macroprudential policy on the transmission mechanism of the model in response to
a firm risk shock, a technology shock and a bank risk shock. It first focuses on active
monetary policy combined with CCB; it then discusses the dynamics under the LATW
policy (coupled with passive monetary policy).
To implement the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate
we apply the piecewise linear perturbation method developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello
(2015). The model with occasionally binding constraint (OBC) is equivalent to a model
with two regimes: (i) under one regime, the OBC is slack; and (ii) under the other regime
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the OBC binds. Monetary policy is then specified as follows:
Zt
Z
=
(
Zt−1
Z
)τR (Πt
Π
)τΠ (bt
b
)τb
, (36)
Rt = max(Zt, 1), (37)
where Zt is the notional policy rate and Rt is the actual policy rate.
The size of each shock is large enough for the constraint to bind. In all the figures of
the impulse responses we assume that the economy stays at the steady state in the first
four quarters and the shock occurs in the fifth quarter. The blue line represents responses
of the piecewise linear solution, where the nominal interest rate reaches the zero lower
bound. The red dashed line represents responses in a regime where the constraint is
ignored. The two scenarios (constrained and unconstrained) share the same pattern of
impulse response functions until the economy hits the ZLB.
4.1 Firm Risk Shock
When there is an exogenous increase in firm risk, firms are more likely to default and
investment projects become riskier. Net worth of firms and bankers both fall, in line
with the positive unconditional correlation between these variables found in U.S. data.14
This shock generates responses more in line with the data – compared to the other two
shocks in the model – similarly to the results by Christiano et al. (2014) and Nuño and
Thomas (2017).This contractionary shock acts as a demand shock, since both output and
inflation fall. We first analyzes the transmission mechanism under active monetary policy
(τpi = 1.2) and aggressive macroprudential policy (ζb = 11) in Figure 4. We then explore
peak responses across a range of CCB parameters. We finally examine the effects of the
LATW policy combined with passive monetary policy.
[ insert Figure 4 here ]
The main results are as follows. First, the simulated recession is more severe when the
ZLB is taken into account, since the contraction in output is greater. The households’
intertemporal choice of consuming versus saving is affected by the ZLB. In response to
the contractionary firm risk shock, the larger fall in the nominal interest rate in the
unconstrained scenario makes saving less profitable. Hence, the shadow value of con-
sumption increases by more in the unconstrained scenario compared to the case of the
14This correlation is always positive in the U.S. post-WII period, and it is equal to 0.45 in the 2000-
2017 sample. Net worth of firms is computed as the difference between total assets and total liabilities,
while net worth of bankers is the difference between bank credit of all commercial banks and deposits of
all commercial banks, as in Gelain and Ilbas (2017). Data are downloaded from the FRED database of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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ZLB. Therefore, ignoring the ZLB constraint implies that impulse responses are biased
and too optimistic in this case. The resulting fall in the stochastic discount factor, βt,t+1,
is larger under the constrained scenario. As a consequence, Tobin’s q decreases by more
in the constrained economy, as evident from the investment demand equation (31). The
fall in investment is hence demand-driven.
In turn, the fall in the rental rate of capital, rKt , is larger under the constrained
scenario than if the ZLB is ignored. Given the definition of the rate of return on capital,
REt , the ex-post gross return to entrepreneurs experiences a larger fall. This explains
why the firm productivity cutoff rises by more. As a consequence, firm net worth falls by
more. The share of the project return accruing to the bank, ΓEt , is positively related to
ωEt , see equation (7). Hence, this variable increases by more in the constrained scenario.
This means that bank profit, ΞFt+1 – positively linked to ΓEt via the bank return on loans,
RFt – falls by less.
The higher share of project return accruing to the bank under the ZLB also causes
a less pronounced fall in bank net worth and a less severe increase in the bank default
rate, as shown by Figure 4. The amount of deposits decreases by less in the constrained
scenario since the fall in the nominal interest rate is less pronounced. The less severe
contraction in saving and the less pronounced fall in bank net worth explain why the
reduction in loans is smaller under the constrained scenario.
Since the nominal interest rate is constrained, the fall in inflation is more pronounced
under the ZLB constraint. Overall, the ZLB-constraint: (1) worsens the macroeconomic
consequences of the shock (as in Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015); (2) worsens the outcome
for entrepreneurs; and (3) dampens the negative effects on banks.
In order to analyze the effects of the macroprudential instrument, Figure 5 shows
the peak responses when the responsiveness of the capital requirement rule varies in
the interval ζb ∈ [11, 15]. A more and more aggressive intervention aimed at stabilizing
financial conditions makes firms less likely to declare default, hence their productivity
cutoff, ω¯E, decreases by more. The fall in entrepreneurial net worth becomes less severe,
so does investment, and hence output. Given the positive relationship between the share
of the project return accruing to the bank and the firm productivity cutoff, the increasing
fall in the latter variable explains why the reduction in bank net worth gets bigger for
a larger CCB coefficient ζb. So, we learn from this exercise that the macroprudential
instrument can reduce the adverse effects of a negative demand shock. However, in the
case of a firm risk shock the CCB policy implies making firms better off relative to
bankers, hence we observe a reduction in bank net worth.
[ insert Figure 5 here ]
For the same size of the shock, the strong macroprudential intervention helps the
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economy avoid the zero lower bound. In fact, for values of ζb > 12, the patterns of the
monetary policy rate coincide under the two scenarios. The fall in deposits occurs only
for low values of ζb, while the increase in the nominal interest rate for values of ζb > 12
makes deposits attractive. Overall, the peak responses of loans – and capital ratio – are
dominated by the path of bank net worth, whose fall is sizeable. The capital ratio, which
is given – by definition – by net worth of banks divided by loans, also falls for a stronger
macroprudential intervention.
Figure 6 shows the transmission mechanism of the firm risk shock under passive
monetary policy (τpi = 0.25) and LATW, with a coefficient of τb equal to 0.25, as in
Melina and Villa (2017). Monetary policy is accommodating, letting inflation increase.
The rise in inflation causes a fall in the shadow value of consumption, contrary to the
case of CCB and active monetary policy. Hence, the increase in the return on capital
leads to a rise in firm net worth. The nominal interest rate falls but inflation rises, hence
the real interest rate unambiguously falls and this causes an increase in investment. It
should be noted that, although the firm risk shock causes an increase in the firm default
rate, the presence of limited liability leads to an increase in the entrepreneurs’ appetite
for investing because entrepreneurs do not internalize the full cost of losses. In fact,
the entrepreneur’s payoff is zero in the case of default. The fall in the shadow value of
consumption combined with the rise in investment leads to an output expansion.
In the absence of CCB, the LATW policy does not have a significant effect on the
banks’ productivity cutoff due to the absence of capital requirements – the capital ratio
remains constant. While the CCB policy directly affects the banking variables, the LATW
policy uses the nominal interest rate also to influence developments in financial conditions,
having indirect effects on the banking variables. Hence the transmission mechanism
originating from bank balance sheets is partially reduced under the LATW policy. Hence,
this policy plays a limited role in stabilizing economic conditions (on this see also Faia
and Monacelli, 2007, and Melina and Villa, 2017). Under this scenario the ZLB has
virtually no effect on real variables mainly because of the accommodative monetary policy.
Inflation and bank loans move in opposite directions in response to a contractionary risk
shock: inflation rises while loans fall. Therefore, the two objectives in the Taylor rule
are conflicting, but monetary and macroprudential policies are conducted with the same
instrument, the nominal interest rate. As a consequence, when the ZLB hits the economy,
the inability of monetary policy to steer its instrument does not have strong effects.
[ insert Figure 6 here ]
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4.2 Technology Shock
Figure 7 shows impulse responses to a technology shock. Since we are interested in the
effects of the ZLB, we simulate an expansionary shock that causes an increase in output
and a fall in inflation. The technology shock has a direct impact on output by making
factors more productive, and leads to a fall in prices due to the expansion in aggregate
supply.
[ insert Figure 7 here ]
Similarly to Clerc et al. (2015), bank default increases, leading to a fall in the bank
lending rate. This bank funding channel (Clerc et al., 2015) stimulates the supply of
loans and investment. On the entrepreneurial side, the increase in the loan-to-value ratio,
xEt , determines a higher firm productivity cutoff, hence the firm default rate increases.
This explains the moderate fall in firm net worth. The effects of the ZLB on financial
variables are evident while the effects on real variables are small. It should be noted that
this expansionary shock moves inflation and output in opposite directions. Hence, the
constraint on the nominal interest rate can affect inflation, whose fall is more pronounced
in the unconstrained scenario, whereas the feedback effects on output are minor for a
moderate CCB coefficient.
Figure 8 shows the effects of a more aggressive CCB in response to the expansionary
technology shock. First of all, a more vigorous response of the capital requirement reduces
the bank default rate and more strongly so in the constrained scenario. This explains why
the increase in investment gets larger for a larger ζb up to the value of 14. The bigger effect
on investment translates into a magnified impact on output in the constrained scenario.
Then, when the economy does not hit the ZLB, the effects of a more aggressive CCB on
banking variables are limited. This is largely explained by the behavior of the rental rate
of capital, which in turn affects the other interest rates. In fact, in the unconstrained
scenario, the increase in rKt is only marginally affected by the value of ζb. A stronger
responsiveness of the capital requirement rule causes a more muted expansion due to the
smaller increase in the real return on equity – for larger ζb – which in turn restrains the
increase in the supply of loans in the unconstrained scenario. Finally, the beneficial effects
of CCB on output are non-linear when the ZLB-constraint is operating. The increase in
output is larger when ζb = 14 and it starts falling for larger values due to the non-linear
effects on the bank default rate.
[ insert Figure 8 here ]
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4.3 Bank Risk Shock
Figure 9 shows the transmission mechanism of the bank risk shock under active monetary
policy combined with CCB. Banks are more likely to default, hence their default rate
increases. This causes a fall in the ex-post gross return on equity – see equation (16) –
and in bankers’ net worth. The supply of loans is hence reduced. The reduced capacity
of the bankers to provide finance for the entrepreneurs acts as a negative supply shock,
in line with Gerali et al. (2010) and Meh and Moran (2010). By contrast, Rannenberg
(2016) finds that the bank capital shock acts as a demand shock.15 Differently from
Clerc et al. (2015), the bank risk shock leads to an increase in investment. This can
be explained by the presence of nominal frictions in our model. In fact, the increase in
inflation causes a rise in the rate of return on capital – see equation (5). The higher
return on capital explains the fact that entrepreneurs are less likely to default, their net
worth increases and they are willing to invest more. Hence, unlike the firm risk shock,
the bank risk shock makes one group (entrepreneurs) better off and the other worse off
(bankers).
[ insert Figure 9 here ]
Since the nominal interest rate increases, it is not possible to investigate the effect
of the constraint represented by the ZLB. Figure 10, instead, examines the implications
of a more aggressive CCB policy in response to the exogenous increase in bank risk.
This figure shows peak responses across various degrees of responsiveness of the CCB
coefficient – ζb ∈ [11, 15]. Similarly to the case of the contractionary firm risk shock,
a stronger response of the macroprudential instruments makes the recession less severe,
since the fall in output and loans is attenuated and investment increases by more. A
more aggressive CCB reduces the bank default rate and this lessens the contractionary
effects of the bank risk shock.
[ insert Figure 10 here ]
Overall this shock causes a (re-)distribution between banks and firms. Further re-
search should address in more detail the empirical implications resulting from risk shocks,
where bank-related and non-financial variables are studied separately.
15A few studies estimated the macroeconomic effects of bank capital shocks and found mixed results
(e.g. Fornari and Stracca, 2012, and Ciccarelli et al., 2015).
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5 Conclusion
This paper models the interdependence of monetary and macroprudential policy rules.
The latter is modelled either as a countercyclical capital buffer or as a ”leaning against the
wind” policy. We pay particular attention to the constraint imposed on monetary policy
arising from the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and to the responsiveness of
the macroprudential authority to rises in bank lending.
We analyze the transmission mechanism of the model in response to a demand shock
– modelled as a firm risk shock – and two supply shocks – modelled as shocks to bank
risk and technology. Overall, the firm-risk shock combined with a CCB policy generates
impulse response functions consistent with patterns observed in the data. The LATW
policy, instead, is not effective in stabilizing financial conditions. In addition, our results
show that while both firms and bankers are worse off in the case of an increase in firm risk,
the bank risk shock as well as the technology shock imply a redistribution of resources
between firms, who become better off, and bankers, who become worse off.
We find that the presence of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate makes
the simulated recession more severe in response to the demand shock of the model, i.e.
the firm risk shock. The main policy lesson of this study is that the countercyclical capital
requirement is a macroprudential instrument appropriate to mitigate the fall in GDP in
response to both firm and bank risk shocks, whereas it has a stabilizing effect on inflation
only in the case of the firm risk shock.
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Table 1: Computation of Steady State
1-2 RD=Πβ , RE= RDυ
3-4 q = 1, rK= [REΠ −(1− δ)]q
5 s = ε−1ε +
κp
ε (1− β)(Π− 1)Π
6-8 K = [ 1A( 1α r
K
s )l
α−1]
1
α−1 , I = δK, Y = ( 1α r
K
s )K
9-10 GE= Φ( lnω
E− 1
2(σ
E)
2
σE
), ΓE= GE+ωE(1− FE)
11-12 FE′= 1
ωEσE
Φ′( lnω
E+ 1
2
(σE)2
σE
), GE′= 1
ωEσE
Φ′( lnω
E− 1
2
(σE)2
σE
)
13 ΓE′= GE′+(1− FE)−ωEFE′
14-15 GF= Φ( lnω
F− 1
2
(σF )2
σF
), ΓF= (1− FF )ωF+GF
16 ξ = ΓE′
(1−ΓF )(ΓE′−µEGE′)
17 nE= (1− χE)(1− ΓE)REqKΠ
18 b = qK − nE
19 RF= (ΓE−µEGE)REqKb
20 RB= (1− ΓF )RFφ
21 nB= φb
22 χB= ι+ 1− Π
RB
23 c = Y − χE(1− ΓE)REqKΠ − I−κp2 (Π− 1)2Y − µEGE R
EqK
Π −µFGF R
F b
Π
24 w = (1− α)sYl
25 ϕ = wclη
26 d = b− nB
27 x =ωERE
28 0 = −1+ 1β (1− χE)
(
1− ΓE) υϱ
29 0 = −ΓE′+ξ(1− ΓF )(ΓE′−µEGE′) = 0
30 0 = (1− ΓE)RE+ξ[(1− ΓF )(ΓE−µEGE)RE−φRB]
31 0 = −FE+Φ( ln(ω
E)+ 1
2(σ
E)
2
σE
)
32 0 = −ωF+(1− φ)RD
RF
33 0 = −FF+Φ( ln(ω
F )+ 1
2(σ
F )
2
σF
)
Given initial values for ωE , µE , σE , χE , ωF , σF , we can compute the 27 parameters RD, RE , q,
rK , s, K, I, Y , w, GE , ΓE , GE′, FE′, ΓE′, ξ, nE , b, nB , d, xE , χB , RF , RB , GF , ΓF , c, ϕ using
equations 1 to 27. We then solve the six equations 28-33 numerically for ωE , µE , σE , χE , ωF , σF ,
given the calibrated parameters in Tables 2 and 3 below, together with the values of the 27 steady
state variables found above.
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Table 2: Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Value Description Target/Reference
Structural Parameters
β = 0.99 Household discount factor BGG (1999)
η = 1 Inverse Frisch labor elasticity Christiano et al. (2014)
ϕ = 0.7461 Preference parameter Labor normalized to 1 in steady state
α = 0.35 Capital share in production BGG (1999)
δ = 0.025 Capital depreciation rate BGG (1999)
ε = 6 Substitutability between goods Christensen and Dib (2008)
κp = 30 Price adjustment cost Smets and Wouters (2007)
κI = 2.43 Investment adjustment cost Carlstrom et al. (2014)
Shock Parameters(1)
σA = 0.001 Size technology shock US data
ρA = 0.9594 Persistence technology shock US data
σEς = 0.001 Size firm risk shock US data
ρE = 0.7810 Persistence firm risk shock US data
σFς = 0.0001 Size bank risk shock US data
ρF = 0.9798 Persistence bank risk shock US data
Inflation Target
Π = 1.005 Steady state inflation US data(2)
Note: (1)See Section 2.6 on calibration strategy to determine the shock parameters. (2)Value corre-
sponds to growth of US GDP deflator over the period 1984-2016.
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Table 3: Financial Parameters and Interest Rates
Value/Target Description Target/Reference
Calibrated Financial Parameters
ϱ ≡ qK
nE
= 2 Entrepreneur leverage ratio BGG (1999)
υ≡RE
RD
= 1.005 Capital return spread BGG (1999)
400FE= 3 Entrepreneur default rate p.a., in % BGG (1999)
400FF= 0.9 Bank default rate p.a., in % US data(1)
φ = 0.08 Bank capital requirement Basel Accords
µF= 0.3 Bank monitoring cost Clerc et al. (2015)
ι= 0.002 Transfer to entering bankers Gertler-Karadi (2011)
Implied Financial Parameters
ωE= 0.499 Entrepreneur productivity cutoff –
χE = 0.018 Entrepreneur exit rate –
µE = 0.100 Entrepreneur monitoring cost –
σE = 0.271 Entrepreneur risk volatility –
ωF= 0.919 Bank productivity cutoff –
σF = 0.029 Bank risk volatility –
χB = 0.022 Banker exit rate –
Implied Steady State Rates of Return
R = 1.0152 Policy rate –
RD= 1.0152 Return on deposits –
RF= 1.0159 Return on loans –
RE= 1.0202 Return on capital –
RB= 1.0252 Return on equity –
Note: All interest rates and rates of return are gross rates. (1)See Section 2.8 on the calibration of
the US bank default rate.
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Figure 1: U.S. Debt-to-GDP Ratios
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Note: Debt is the amount of total liabilities. Data on debt are downloaded from Flow of Funds
Accounts, Federal Reserve Board, Table L.101 for households and nonprofit organizations, and from
Table L.102 for non-financial business. Data on GDP are dowloaded from the FRED database of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Figure 2: Determinacy Anaysis: CCB Model
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Note: The figure shows the determinacy regions in the simplified CCB model without leaning against
the wind in the interest rate rule (τb = 0) and countercyclical capital buffer (ζb > 0).
Figure 3: Determinacy Anaysis: LATW Model
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Note: The figure shows the determinacy regions in the simplified LATW model with leaning against
the wind in the interest rate rule (τb > 0) and a constant capital requirement (ζb = 0).
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to the contractionary firm risk shock with and without the
zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate in the case of CCB and active
monetary policy (ζb = 11 and τpi = 1.2)
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Figure 5: Peak responses to the contractionary firm risk shock with and without the zero
lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate for ζb ∈ [11, 15]
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to the contractionary firm risk shock with and without the
zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate in the case of LATW and passive
monetary policy (τb = 0.25 and τpi = 0.25)
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to the expansionary technology shock with and without the
zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate in the case of CCB and active
monetary policy (ζb = 11 and τpi = 1.2)
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Figure 8: Peak responses to the expansionary technology shock for ζb ∈ [11, 15]
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to the contractionary bank risk shock in the case of CCB
and active monetary policy (ζb = 11 and τpi = 1.2)
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Figure 10: Peak responses to the contractionary bank risk shock for ζb ∈ [11, 15]
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